Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1967

Atlas Corporation v. Donald T. Adams, Orville
Gunther, A. Pratt Kesler, and Ransom Quinn,
Members of the State Tax Commission of Utah,
and George W. Barben, Executive Secretary of the
State Tax Commission of Utah, and the State Tax
Commission of Utah : Plaintiff 'S Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Clifford L. Ashton, Leonard J. Lewis, and David E. Salisbury;
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Atlas Corp. v. Adams, No. 10522 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3762

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

l
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF THE CASE._________________________________

1

STATEMENT OFF ACTS____________________________________________

3

STA 'rEMENT OF POINTS________________________________________

7

ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------

9

POINT I.
THERE IS NO PERSONAL LIABILITY
FOR REAL PROPERTY TAXES, INCLUDING SUCH TAXES BASED UPON
AN ASSESSED VALUATION DERIVED
FROM ''NET PROCEEDS'' ------------------------------

9

POINT II.
THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVENUE
AND TAXATION CODE AUTHORIZING
ISSUANCE OF AND EXECUTION UPON
WARRANTS FOR THE COLLECTION
OF THE UNPAID REAL PROPERTY
TAXES SOUGHT TO BE COLLECTED
BY DEFENDANTS FROM PLAINTIFF
HEREIN ----------------------------------------------------------------

14

POINT III.
THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVENUE
AND TAXATION CODE AUTHORIZING
THE COMMISSION TO REQUIRE DEPOSIT OF SECURITY FOR THE PAYMENT OF REAL PROPERTY TAXES
ON URANIUM AND VANADIUM MINES
DO NOT GIVE RISE TO PERSONAL
LIABILITY FOR SUCH TAXES____________________

17

TABL~~ OF CONTEN'l'S- (Continued)

Page

POINT IV
UTAH CANNOT CONSTI'l'UTIONALLY
IMPOSE A 'l'AX FOR TH1£ YEAR 1965
ON THE PROPERTY INVOLVED IN
THIS CASE BECAUSE SAID PROPER'l'Y '\VAS WORTHLESS THROUGHOUT SAID YEAR AND THE TAX
BEARS NO REASON ABLE RELATION
TO THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY ----------------------------------------------------------

10

(A) THE FOURTE:BJNTH AMENDMENT
TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES --------------------------------------

19

(B) ARTICLE XIII, SECTIONC 2 AND
3; ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26(8);
AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 24, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH______________________________

22

POINTV.
THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVENUE
AND TAXATION CODE, IF DEE:MED
TO GIVE RISE TO PERSONAL LIABILITY, CONSTITUTE AN ARBITRARY
AND UNREASON ABLE CLASSIFICATION OF URANIUM AND VANADIUM
MINES IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDJ\fET TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AND ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26(8) AND
ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH______________________________________

24

CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------

26

.

TABLE OF CONTENTS- (Continued)
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES CITED

San .J nan County and State Tax Commission of
Utah v ..Jen, Inc., 16 U. 2d 394, 401 P. 2d
952 (1965) ____________ 2, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 26, 27
Citizens Coal Co. v. Capitol Cleaners & Dyers,
Inc., 120 U. 285, 233 P. 2d 377 (1951 )--------------------

10

Crystal Car Line v. State Tax Commission,
110 U. 426, 174 P. 2d 984 (1946)________________________

10

Crismon v. Reich, 2 U.

llL__________________________________________

10

Wh0eling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562,
69 R. Ct. 1291, 93 L.Ed. 1544 ( 1949 )--------------------

25

South Utah Mines & Smelters v. Beaver County,
262 U.S. 325, :130-332, 43 S. Ct. 577,
578-580 ( 1923) ____________________________________________________ 20, 21, 23
Territory of Alaska v_ American Can Company,
269 F. 2d 471, 475 (9th Cir. 1959)________________________

10

In re Chicago Rys. Co., 79 F. Supp. 989 (N. D.

I11. 1948), affirmed 175 F. 2d 282 (7th Cir.
1949), certiorari denied 338 U.S. 850, 70 S.
Ct. 94, 94 L.Ed. 520 (1949)________________________________

22

Santos v. Simon, 138 P. 2d 896 (Ariz. 1943)____________

10

Maricopa County v. Arizona Tractor &
Equipment Co., 109 P. 2d 618 (Ariz. 1941)____

10

People ex rel. Ross v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.
R. Co., 44 N.E. 2d 566 (Ill. 1942)------------------------

22

Board of Commissioners of Ness County v.
Hooper, et al., 204 Pac. 536 (Kan. 1922)____________

10

Blaustein v. Levin, 4 A. 2d 861 (Md. 1939)------------

25

Stone v. City of Springfield, 178 N.E. 2d 76
(Mass. 1960) ----------------------------------------------------------

22

TABLE OF CONTENTS- (Continued)
Page
Dehydrating Process Co. of Gloucester v. City of
Gloucester, 135 N.E. 2d 20 (Mass. 1956)____________

25

Calkins v. Smith, 78 P. 2d 74 (Mont. 1938)________________

10

State ex rel. Spokane and Eastern Trust Co. v.
Nicholson, County Treasurer, 240 Pac. 837
(Mont. 1925) ----------------------------------------------------------

10

New York State Trailer Coach Ass 'n v. Steckel,
144 N.Y.S. 2d 82 (1955)----------------------------------------

25

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. City of Youngstown, 108 N.E. 2d 571 (Ohio App. 1951)____________

25

Appeal of National Bank of Tulsa, 312 P. 2d 495
( Okl. 1957) --------------------------------------------------------------

22

McDonald v. Duckworth, 173 P. 2d 436 (Okl. 1946)__

10

Allen v. Henshaw, 168 P. 2d 625 (Okla. 1946)____________

10

City of Salem v. Marion County, 137 P. 2d 977
(Ore. 1943) _____ ------------------------------------------------------

10

Federal Land Bank of Houston v. State,
314 S.W. 2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958)____________

25

Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Cowlitz
County, 234 P. 2d 506 (Wash. 1951 )--------------------

10

CoNSTITUTION PROVISIONS CITED
A.

Constitution of the United States:
~mendment

B.

XIV, Section L __________________ 9, 19, 24, 25

Constitution of Utah:
Article I, Section 24 ____________________________________ 9, 22, 23, 24
Article VI, Section 26(8) ________________________ 9, 22, 23, 24
Article VIII, Section 4 _________________________ ____________

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS- (Continued)
Page
Article XIII, Section 2 --------------------------------------

9, 22

Article XIII, Section 3 --------------------------------------

9, 22

STATUTORY PROVISIONS CITED

Utah Code Annotated, 1953:
Section 59-1-1 -------------------------------------------------------Section 59-5-57

15
4,15

Section 59-5-58 -----------------------------------------------------15
Section 59-5-65 (1965 Supp.) __________________________ l 7, 18, 19
Sections 59-5-66 through 59-5-85__________________________

15

Section 59-5-79 __________________________________ 5, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17
Section 59-5-80 ____________________________________ 5, 13, 14, 15, 16,17
Section 59-10-1 -----------------------------------------------------13
Section 59-10-22 ___________________________________________ 5, 14, 16, 17
Section 68-3-1 --------------------------------------------------------

11

Section 78-2-2 --------------------------------------------------------

2

Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917:
Section 6090 ------------------------------------------------------------

10

Section 6091 ------------------------------------------------------------

10

Section 6092 ------------------------------------------------------------

11

Utah Session Laws:
Laws of Utah, 1937, Chapter lOL______________________

15

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 65B (b) ( 4) ------------------------------------------------------

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS -

(Continued)
Page

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED

S. B. 8, 1966, First Special Session,
Utah Legislature ----------------------------------------------------

12

3 Utah Public Documents, 1932-1934,
"Second Biennial Report of the State
Tax Commission of Utah," p. 23________________________

11

3 Utah Public Documents, 1934-1936, "Third
Biennial Report of the State Tax
Commission of Utah," p. 24 -------------------------------84 C.J.S., "Taxation,"~ 643, p. 1318________________________

12
10

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
A1'LAS CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff,
-vs.T. ADAMS, ORYILLE GUNrrl IEH, A. PRATT KESL1'JR, and RANSO~I QFINN, MEMBERS OF TIU~
Sl'Arl'E TAX COl\HIISSION OF UTAH,
and GI~OROI1J vV. BARBEN, EXECU'lT\~J·~ 81~Cltr~TARY OF THE STATE
'i',\X COJ\Il\LISSlON OF l~TAH, and THE
:--;'t'A'l'T1J TAX CO.:'IE\llSSION OF UTAH,
Def cndants.
DO~ALD

Case
No.

10522

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
'l'his is an original action in the Supreme Court of
l'tah in which plaintiff seeks issuance of a Peremptory
Writ of Prohibition prohibiting defendants from executing upon certain warrants issued by defendant, The State
Tax Commission of Utah, against all of plaintiff's real
and tangible personal property in three counties, for the
lJUq>ose of imposing personal liability upon plaintiff for
payment of rPal property taxes assessed against two
worthless mining properties, and from requiring that
plaintiff personally furnish security for the payment of
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such taxes, and from in any other manner seeking to
collect such taxes by means other than the sale of the
property taxed. On .January 4th, 19GG, this Court issued
an Alternative -Writ of Prohibition and Order to Show
Cause why the Peremptory ·writ of Prohibition prayed
for should not issue.
The jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine
this case and to grant the relief requested by plaintiff is
expressly provided by Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah
Constitution, and by Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, and Rule G5B (b) ( 4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The issues presented in this action are urgent public
questions of general importance to the State of 1:Jtah
and its citizens. Defendants have not been content to
abide by the decision of this Court in San Juan County
and State Tax Commission of Utah v. Jen, Inc., 16 U.2d
394, 401 P.2d 952 ( 1965), and to seek a solution to their
grievances through legislative action, but, with apparent
disdain for that decision, have endeavored to circumvent
it. Defendants' actions discredit the authority of this
Court and that discredit must be rectified by this Comt.
Defendants' unconcerned resort in this isolated instance
to summary warrant proceedings for the collection of
these real property taxes threatens the integrity of the
Utah tax system. An early determination of the issues is
in the interest of the parties and the public and is necessary to prevent irreparable loss and damage to plaintiff.
Plaintiff's verified Complaint and Petition for vVrit
of Prohibition sets forth in detail the facts necessary to
the decision of the issues here presented. Defendants

have stipulated to the truth of the factual statements
contained in paragTaphs 1 through 28 of the Complaint
and Petition. Based upon these facts, plaintiff contends
that the taxes in question do not constitute a personal
obligation of plaintiff and that the actions of defendants
are unconstitutional.
Defendanh; claim that the summary warrant procedure applied by them in this case for the collection of
real property taxes from plaintiff entitles the Commission, forthwith upon docketing the warrants, to institute
a ~heriff's sale of all of a taxpayer's real and tangible
iwrsonal property in the State, the same to be accomplished without the necessity of notice to the property
owner, without l't'gard to any limitation as to time, and
without any right of redemption of property sold through
the t-iheriff's sale. Plaintiff contends that the drastic and
harsh procedures advocated in this case and actually employed by defendants as against plaintiff are repugnant
to tht> real property tax laws, customs and concepts of
the State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation duly qualified
to engage in business in the State of Utah. Defendants
are the members and executive secretary of The State
'rax Commission of Utah and The State Tax Commission
of Utah. (For convenience, where The State Tax Commission of Utah is referred to hereafter separately from
the remaining defendants, it is referred to as the "Commission.")
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Plaintiff is engaged in the mnung, t•xtraeting and
processing of uranium and vanadium ores in l~talt and
owns or operates various mining properti<:>s from which
it mines such ores. Plaintiff's mining properties were
assessed by the Commission for the year l!)(j5 for
real property taxes pursuant to tlw provisions of t:)e(·tion 59-5-57, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides
for the assessment of metallifrrous mining properties on
the so-called ''net proct>eds" basis. Plaintiff has paid all
19G5 real property taxes exct~pt such taxPs as~wssed
against the Mi Vida Mine and the South Almar ~line
situated in San Juan County, Utah. Both of thesP mines
were depleted prior to January 1, 19G5, and on January
1, 19G5, and throughout the year 19G5 were valueless.
Dcf endants have asst~ssed taxes against the 1\li Vida
Mine for 1965 in the sum of $248,312.59, based upon an
assessed valuation as of January l, 19G5, of $5,988,342.00,
and have assessed taxes against the South Almar 1\Ii1w
for 19G5 in the sum of $2G8,022.H, based upon an asspssed
valuation as of January 1, 19G5, of $G,4G3,GG7.00. These
assessed valuations are equal to two times the average·
net annual proceeds n•alized from the operation of tlH•
.Mi Vida and South Alrnar 1\Iines rPspectivdy for the
calendar years 1962, 1963 and 1964.

On .July 9, 19G5, the Commission served upon plaintiff a demand for security for payment of the 19G3
and 19G6 real property taxes assessed against all of plaintiff's mining rmlperties, including the 1\li Vida and
South Almar 1\lines. In dne course, plaintiff paid all
taxes assessed against its mining pro1wrties except the•
1
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taxes assessed against the l\li Yida and South Almar
Mines. Upon plaintiff's refusal to furnish the demanded security, defendants initiatt>d jeopardy proceedings, and served upon plaintiff a Notice of Jeopardy
Assessment, pursuant to which a hearing was held before
the Commission, at which plaintiff filed a written protest
to the jeormrdy proceedings. Defendants, on November
10, 1965, by written decision, declared the 1965 real
property taxes assc>ssed against the Mi Vida and South
Alrnar l\li1ws to be in jeopardy.
Defendants then initiated in the name of the Comrni;,;sion and San Juan Com1ty an action in the San Juan
County District Comt seeking to restrain all plaintiff's
01wrations, irrespective of the property upon 'vhich conducted, and to obtain appointment of a receiver to take
possession of and hold all of plaintiff's properties. Defendants' application for preliminary injunction and appointment of a receiver was heard before the Honorable
F. \V. Keller, who, on December 3, 1965, rendered a Memorandum Decision denying the requested injunction and
the request for appointment of a receiver. On December
S, 1965, the Commission and San Juan County voluntarily
di:•nnissed the pending action in the San Juan County
District Court.
On ~ecember 1, 1965, defendants, presumably acting
pmsuant to Sections 59-5-79 and 59-5-80, and possibly
Section 59-10-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, served
upon plaintiff a Notice and Declaration of Taxes in J eo1iardy, and pursuant thereto, on December 6, 1965, defondants docketed warrants in the sum of $516,335.00
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m the offices of the County Clerks of Salt Lake, San
Juan and Grand Counties. Defondants assert theil'
right to effect collection of the 19G5 real property taxes
assessed against the l\li Yida Mine and the South Almar
Mine by execution upon these warrants, which are a
cloud upon plaintiff's title to all real and tangible riersonal property owned by plaintiff and situated in the
three named counties.
On December 10, 1965, the Commission filed with
the Salt Lake County District Court an Affidavit for
Issuance of Execution and a Notice of Motion for
Leave to Issue Execution seeking sanction from the
Salt Lake County District Court for execution upon
the warrant docketed with the Salt Lake County Clerk.
On December 14, 1965, plaintiff initiated an action
against the Commission by the filing of a Complaint
in the Salt Lake County District Court, seeking to enjoin the Commission from executing upon the warrants theretofore docketed, from enforcing personal liability against plaintiff for payment of the subject taxes,
and for a declaratory judgment concerning the rights
and duties of the parties. At the same time, plaintiff
also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The
Commission's Answer to, and Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff's Complaint were filed on December 15, 1965. On
December 20, 1965, plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, the Commission's Motion for Leave to Issue
Execution upon the warrant docketed in Salt Lake County
and thP Commission's Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Complaint were heard before the Honorable A. H. Ellett,
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who granted the Commission's Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Complaint and entered judgment accordingly.
As noted above, the taxes in question were assessed
against two mining properties known as the Mi Vida
and the South Alrnar Mines, which were valueless
on January 1, 1965, and throughout the year 1965. No
operations were conducted upon these properties during
191i3. No ores were mined from these properties in 1965.
No proceeds whatever 'vere realized from production of
ores from these properties in 1965.
'11 0 the knowledge of the parties, neither defendants

nor any of their predecessors in office have at any time,
in the administration of the real property tax laws of
this State, sought to collect taxes on real property by the
su1111nary procedure of docketing warrants enforceable
personally against the owner of the properties. The use
of warrants has been limited to cases where there is unquestioned personal liability, in an unquestioned amount,
for payment of taxes other than real property taxes. No
effort has ever been made by defendants or any of their
predecessors in office to collect any taxes on real property by personal action against the owner or operator of
the property except in the case of uranium and vanadium
mining properties.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Plaintiff relies upon the following points to support
issuance of a Peremptory vVrit of Prohibition herein:
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POINT I.
THERE IS NO PERSONAL LIABILITY FOH
REAL PROPER'l1 Y TAXJ£S, INCLUDING
SUCH 'l'AXES BAS1£D UPON AN ASSESSED V ALUA'l'ION DEHTVJ£D F'RO.:\I "NE'l1
PROCEEDS."
POIN'r II.
THE PROVISIONS OF THE RJ£VE~UE AND
TAXATION CODE AUTHORIZJNG ISSlL
ANCE OF AND 1'JXE.CUTION 1:-PON -WARRANTS FOR THE COLLECTIOX OF l'NPAID TAXES DO NOT RELA'rJ~ OR APPLY
TO THE COLLECTION OF THE UNPAID
REAL PROPERTY TAXES SOUGHT 'I'O
BE .COLLECTED BY DEFENDAN'rS FROi\I
PLAINTIFF HERJ1JIN.
1

POIXT III.
THE PROVISIONS OF THE RE\TEXTTT£ AKD
TAXA'l'ION CODE AU'l HORIZING 1'HE
CO~U.TISSION TO Rl~QlTlRE DEPOSIT OF'
SECURITY FOR THE PAYMENT OF REAL
PROPERTY TAXES ON URANIUM AND
V ANADlUl\l MINES DO NOT GIVE RISE
TO PJ<:JRSONAL LIABILITY FOR SUCH
TAXES.
1

POINT IV.
UTAH CANNOT CONSTITUTIONALLY HIPOSJ~ A TAX FOR THE YEAR 19G5 ON
THE PROPER11 Y INVOLVED IN THIS
CASE BECAUSE SAID PROPERTY \VAS
\VOR1' HLESS THROUGHOUT SAID YJ~AR
AND 'J1 HE TAX BEARS NO REASONABLJ~
RELATION 1'0 THE ACTUAL V ALUliJ OF
1
THJ~ PROPEH1 Y.
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(A) THE FOGRTEENTH Al\lENDl\IENT TO
1
'1 HE CONS'11 ITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATJ~S;

( B) AR'l'ICLE XIlI, SECTIONS 2 A~D 3;
AHTICLI~ YI, SECTION 2G(S); AND
ARTICLE I, SECTIO~ 24, CONSTITlTTION OF PTAH.
POINTY.
THE PHUVlSIONS 01<' 'l'HE Rl~\'ENUE
AND TAXA'l'ION CODE, IF DEEl\IED TO
GIYE RISE 'rO PEHSONAL LIABILITY,
CONSTITPT1'~ AN ARBITRARY AND UNI{ l<~ AS 0 NAB L J<; CLASSIFICATION OF
URANTFM AND \'ANADIU:M MINES IN
\' IOLA'rION 0 F T HE FOURTEENTH
Al\11~ND1IENT TO THE CONSTITUION OF
'rHE UNITED STA'I':b~S AKD ARTICLE YI,
SI£iCTION 26(8) AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION
2-t- OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
'rHI'JRE lS NO PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR
REAL PROPERTY TAXES, INCLUDING
SUCH TAXES BASED UPON AN ASSESSED VALUATION DERIVED FORM "NET
PROCEEDS."
'rhis question was squarely presented to this Court
in 1965 in the case of San Jiian County and State Tax
Commission of Utah v. Jen, Inc., 16 U.2d 394, 401 P.2d
952 ( 19G5). This Court rendered its decision in that case
on May 17, 1965. After full consideration of the entire
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question, which was brit'fed thoroughly and argut>d ably ,
for the Commission by counsel appearing in this action '
on behalf of defendants, this Court held ''that the tax upon
real property is a charge upon the property and not in
the nature of an in personam obligation of the owner. ... "
This holding is clearly consonant with the prior decisions
of this Court ( Crisnwn v. Reich, 2 U. 111; Citizens Coal
Co. v. Capitol Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., 120 U. 285, 233 P.2d
377 (1951); Crystal Car Liue v. State Tax Commission,
110 U. 426, 174 P.2d 98-1 (l94G) ), and ·with the decisions
of other Courts interpreting ancl applying statutory provisions equivalent to the provisions of the Utah Code.
(Board of Commissioners of Ness County v. Hooper, et
al., 204 Pac. 536 (Kan. 1922); Calkins v. Smith, 78 P.2d
74 (Mont. 1938); State ex rel. Spokane and Eastern Trust
Co. v. Nicholson, County Treasurer, 240 Pac. 837 (Mont.
1925); Santos v. Simon, 138 P.2d 89G (Ariz. 19-13); Maricopa County v. Arizona Tractor & Equipment Co., 109
P.2d G18 (Ariz. 19-±1); McDonald v. Ducku:orth, 173 P.2d
-136 (Old. 19-16); Allen v. Henshaw, 1G8 P.2d G25 (Old.
1946); City of Salem v. Marion County, 137 P.2d 977
(Ore. 19-±3); Pi,gct Sound Power & Light Co. v. Cowlitz
County, 234 P.2d 506 (Wash. 1951).)
1

:Moreover, such holding is consistent with the legislative history of the statutes. It is well established that,
at the common law, there is no personal liability on the
part of an O"wner for taxes levied upon his real property.
(Territory of Alaska v. American Can Company, 269 F.
2d 471, 475 (9th Cir. 1959); 84 C.J.S., "Taxation," ~ 6-13,
p. 1318.) A statutory provision is nt>cessary to create such
personal liability. Prior to 1933, Sections G090, G091 and
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fi092, Compiled La\\·s of l~ tah, 1917, expressly provided
for a versonal action against the owner of real property
against which taxes had been assessed that were delinquent in an amount of $300.00 or more. These provisions
were deleted from our statutes with the adoption of the
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. 'l'here are at this time
no provisions giving rise to personal liability for the
payrnent of ad valorem real property taxes in the Utah
statutes, and hence the common law rule that there is no
personal liability for such taxes should and must be recognized, for the Legislature has expressly adopted the
eomrnon law in cases not governed by the Constitution
and laws of the State. (Section 68-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.)
lt is significant that the Commission, in its Second
Biennial Report rendered October 31, 1934, considered
at length the difficulty of collecting real property taxes
on mining properties arising from the exclusivity of
tho statutory renwdy of sale of the property subject
to the four-year redemption period. The problem was
statPd in terms of the possibility that the mining
pro1wrty preliminarily sold for the taxes might be
dl'plded during the four-year redemption period, and,
hence, lack sufficient value when the sale became final
to satisfy the taxes. After stating this problem, the
Commission recommended "the amendment of the
la"· so as to authorize the collection of the tax, with
venalty and interest, by suit or otherwise immediately after delinquency." (3 Utah Public Documents,
1932-1934, "Second Biennial Report of the State Tax
Commission of Utah," page 23.) The Commission's

12

concern and rec01m11emlation m this n'gard was l'<'iterated in its '11 hird Biennial Heport. (See 3 Utah
Public Documents, 193-l:-193G, "'l'hird Biennial Heport
of the State Tax Commission of 11 tah," page 2-1:.) Not\Yithstanding this reconnrn'ndation, the Legislature has
never acted to provide a means \\'hereby real property
taxes may be collected through the assertion of a personal claim against the property owner.
Defendants have urged and are urging the LTtah judiciary, including this Court, to give an effect to the Utah
statutes which the legislative branch of government has
conside1·ed and repudiated. This is obviously true in
Yiew of the efforts, of which this Court may take judicial notice, to have the 1966 Special Session of the
Utah Legislature adopt a statute expressly providing
for personal liability for payment of real property taxes
and by the Legislature's refusal to enaet such proposed
legislation. (S.B. 8, First Special Session, Thirty-Sixth
Legislature, 1966.)
Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court did not
ignore or overlook the questions and arguments raised by
defendants and their able counsel in the Jen case which
was decided only eight months ago. The Jen decision
clearly, decisively and correctly determined that then~
is no personal liability for the payment of taxes on real
property, including, in this case as in the Jen case, real
property taxes assessed against metalliferous uranium
and vanadium mining properties upon the basis of nrt
proceeds realized in periods prior to the date of assessment.
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lt is disturbing that defendants - public officials
<·harged with the duty of upholding the law - would
attempt, by the issuance and docketing of warrants and
threatened execution thereupon and by other action, to
circumvent and avoid the holding of this Court in the
Jen case. Defendants' activities are doubly disturbing beeause defendants' Petition for Hehearing of the Jc n case
was expressly based upon Sections 59-5-79 and 59-5-80,
l~tah Code Annotated, 1953, which sections provide for
the issuance of warrants for the collection of certain
taxes, and upon which sections defendants apparently
rely as authorizing their conduct in this case. The decision of this Court denying defendants' Petition for Helwaring of the Jen case correctly disposed of the contc·ntion that the warrant procedure was applicable to real
property taxes upon metalliferous mining claims assessed
on the basis of nd proceeds.

Defendants have suggested that this case can be
distinguished from the Jen case on the ground that in the
Jen case the real property that was taxed \Vas sold preliminarily to the county for the taxes prior to the atfrrnpted imposition of personal liability therefor. However, it is submitted that the holding of this Court in the
Jen case is not based upon any theory of election of
remPdies. Indeed, the Court expressly held that under
the Utah statutes the sole remedy is to enforce the lien
uiion the taxed property provided for by the statutes.
After quoting Section 59-10-1, Utah Code Annotated,
195:3, the Court in the Jen decision held:
''From the emphasized language it will be
noted -;;nat the recourse is to the property, and

14
that the ::;rntute contains no ex11ress indication that
the ta:x unligation runs to the owner. This court ha~
heretofore held that since the legislature has provided 1his means for the collection of propert)·
taxes, which is based upon a lien upon the property, and has omitted expressing any intent that
there should be a personal judgment, that no such
personal obligation e.Tists." (Emphasis added.) (Hi
U.2d 394, 396.)
For thP foregoing reasons, plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court has clearly and correctly resolYed
the questions raised by defendants by holding in the Jen
case that there is no such personal liability under our
statuks.
POINT II.
THE PROVISIONS OF·THE REVENUE AND
'rAXATION CODE AUTHORIZING ISSUANCI£ OF AND EXECUTION UPON WARRANTS FOR THE COLLECTION OF UNPAID TAXES DO NOT RELA'l'E OR APPLY
TO THE COLLECTION OF' THI£ UNPAID
REAL PROPERTY TAXES SOUGHT '1'0 BE
COLLECTED BY DEFENDANTS FROM
PLAINTIFFS ITl~RT<JIN.
1

Defendants rely upon Section 59-5-79 and 59-5-80,
and upon Section 59-10-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as authorizing issuance of and execution upon warrants
as a propf'.r vrocedure for the collection of the taxes in
question. This argument is not new to this Court. Defendants, in their Petition for Rehearing in the Jen case,
argued that the decision "fails to take into consideration
Sections 59-5-79 and 59-5-80, U.C.A., 1953, wherein the tax
commission is directly empowered to seize and sell all
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real and personal property of a delinquent taxpayer for
the payment of the tax debt." (San Juan County and
8tatc Ta.r Commission v. Jen, Inc., supra, Appellants'
Petition for Hehearing and Brief in Support Thereof,
page 2.) By its denial of defendants' Petition for Rehearing in the Jen case, this Court properly rejected
tkfrndants' patent misinterpretation of these sections.
By their terms, Sections 59-5-79 and 59-5-80 apply only
to a "tax imposed by this chapter. ... " (Section 59-5-79,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.) This section was adopted
by the lTtah Legislature in 1937 as Chapter 101, Laws of
Ptah, 1937. Chapter 101 imposed only the Mining Occu1iation Tax, now provided for in Sections 59-5-66 through
i59-5-S5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. That chapter did
11ot impose and does not impose any tax whatever on real
property.
Chapter 101, Laws of Utah, 1937, in addition to
imposing the Mining Occupation Tax, also amended Sections 80-5-56 and 80-5-57 (now Sections 59-5-57 and 59-538, Utah Code Annotated, 1953), which sections prescribe
the mode of assessment of metalliferous mines and mining claims. However, said sections do not impose any
tax. They are purely administrative and provide for the
assessment of metalliferous mines and mining claims at
$5.00 per acre plus an amount equal to two times the
average net annual proceeds for a preceding period.
rt'he ad valorem tax on real property is imposed by
Section 59-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Section 591-1 is not, of course, a part of Chapter 101, Laws of Utah,
1937.
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lt is entirely tmd,~rstandabk· that th(; Co11m1il'
sion be V(:'sted ~with authority to i:::;sne warrants for thl'
collection of the l\tining Occupation Tax becansl' there is
personal liability for payuwnt of the Mining Occupation
Tax. lf the provisions of Sections 59-3-79 and 59-5-80 arP
limited to the collection of l\lining· Occupation rraxes, no
problems arise in applying tlw prnvisions to cany out the
statutory sche1m>. If, howevPr, the said sections are eonstrued to apply to all real property taxes, including tlu~
tax on metalliferous mines and mining claims, many
statutory prnhlemt> aris(:'.
It is also clear that Section 59-10-22 was not internled to apply to the collection of real property taxes,
for that section, by its terms, relates only to situations where '"the tax commission shall find that a person
liable for the payment of any tax which is collectible by
the tax commission designs quickly to depart from tlw
State of Utah .... " Renee, the condition for application
of Section 59-10-22 is that there be a person liable for
the payment of a tax. It is the express holding of this
Court in the Jc11 ("asc that no vcrson is liable for the payment of ad valorern taxes on real prnperty, the tax being
"a charge upon the prnperty, and not in the nature of ai1
in personam obligation of the owner .... " (lG U.2d 39-t,
397.) ·rrherefore, Section 59-10-22 is elearly not apvlieable.

Moreover, Section 59-10-22 relates only to taxes ''collectible by the tax commission.... "Also, Sections 59-5-79
and 59-5-80 give authority only to the Commission to issue
warrants. Tlw ad valorem tax on real property, includ-
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ing such taxl'S based on "net proceeds," are payable to and
collectible by the counties of the State, not the Commiss10n.
The use of warrants under Sections 59-5-79, 59-5-80
and 59-10-22 is a drastic remedy that subjects all the
n·al and tangible personal property of a taxpayer to execntion and sale. Under well established principles, these
sections cannot be given the effect suggested by defendants in the absence of an um•quivocally clear expression
that such effect is intended. That intent cannot be found
in any Utah statutes. 'rhe statutes evidence an intent
to the contrary.

POINT III.
THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVENUE AKD
'J'AXATION CODE AUTHORIZING THE
COMMISSION TO REQUIRE DEPOSIT OF
SECURITY FOR '11 HE PAYl'.IENT OF REAL
PROPERTY 'rAXES ON URANIUM AND
\-ANADlUM MINES DO NOT GIYE RISE
'1 0 PERSO,'.I AL LIABILITY FOR SUCH
'l'AXES.
1

Section 59-5-65, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (1965
Supp.), provides, among other things, a method by
which the Commission can require that an owner or
operator of a uranium and vanadium mining property deposit security in advance of the due date of
taxes assessed against such property to insure payment of such taxes. Without conceding the validity
of that procedure either generally or as applied or
sought to be applied in this case, plaintiff submits that
this procedure was available to defendants and that def<•ndants' 11l'esent position results directly from their
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failure to utilize or enforce m a ti11wly manner the
remedy provich'd by this section. 'rhis remed)· has l>een
available to thP Commission since the amenduwnt of ~re
tion S9-5-G5 that became dfective on May U, 19G3. llo\Yever, the Commission did nothing to avail itself of that
remedy until the decision of this Court in the Jen case
in ~lay, 19G5. Defendants' failure to avail itself sPasonably of express statutory remedies ought not to provide a basis for defendants' present efforts to create
other remedies by way of personal liability that the statutes do not provide.
Indeed. in 1965, defendants finally invoked the provisions of Section 59-5-65 in this case by demanding that
plaintiff deposit security for the payment of all real property taxes that had been assessed against plaintiff's mining properties. Plaintiff has paid and satisfied all of
such taxes in respect of all propertit>s other than
the brn pro1wrties involved in this case, the .Mi Vida and
South Almar l\lines. \Vith respect to tlwsc properties,
plaintiff has refused the demanded security, and defendants have availed tlwmst>lves of the l'Prnecly Pxpressly
provided therefor by Section 59-5-65.
That n·medy
does not expressly or implicitly indude a personal daim
against the person from whom the security is demanded.
Rather, the remedy is to obtain a decree restraining
operations on the properties in c1uestion until the required
security has been deposited. Defendants have abandoned
the action that they initiated in the San .Juan County
District Court to obtain such reliPf. Ag·ain, defendants'
unilah•ral decision not to seek the relief expressly provided by Sc,dion 59-;"}-G5 for iilaintiff's failure to deposit
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th(' U('manded SP('Urity in no way 1:,rives rise to a personal
daim against plaintiff for the taxes in question.
For the fon•going reasons, plaintiff respectfully
sulnnits that deft>ndants have and at all times relevant
to this proceeding have had available to them a wholly
a<lPllllate remedy to prott-ct their position, which remedy
dd'l'ndants have not exercised, and that neither Section
59-5-(i5 nor defendants' failure to exercise the remedy
tlwrein provided, provide a basis for defendants' present
assertion that plaintiff is personally liable for the subject
taxes.

POINT IV.
UTAH CANNOT CONSTITUTIONALLY BIPOSE A TAX FOR THI~ Yl~AR 1965 0::\1" THE
PROPERTY INVOLVED IN THIS CASE BECAUSE SAID PROPERTY WAS WOR'fHLESS THROUGHOUT SAID YEAR AND
THE 'l'AX BEARS NO REASONABLE RELAION 'fO THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY.
(A) 'L'HE FOURTEENTH AMENDl\IENT TO
THI1~ CO~STI'l'UTION OF THE UNITED
STATES;
'l'he lower court found and defendants have stipulated in this proceeding that the Mi Vida and South Almar
::\lines were worthless on January 1, 1965, and throughout
the year 1965. Notwithstanding this undisputed fact, def'Pndants maintain the validity of assessed valuations
of $5,988,342.00 on the Mi Vida l\Iine as of January 1,
1965, and $G,4G3,GG7.00 on the South Almar :Mine as of
.January 1, 1965, and claim authority, based upon such
dainwd assessrnen ts, to collect real property taxes
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m the amount of $2-18,312.59 m the case f the Mi
Vida Mine and $2G8,022 ..U in th<:> case of the S1 uth Almar
Mine for said tax year. The question is therefore squan·ly presented to this Court vdwther worthle~ property
can validly and constitutionally be assessed l : the year
19G5 at an aggregate valuation in excess of $12,000 ' ' J.00.
In a case presenting a substantially identical
ohlem under the Utah statutes involved in this cas tlte
United States Supreme Court has held that the ,,atP
of Utah cannot constitutionally assess a mining 1 "O}lerty for a given tax year upon the basis of net proceeds
at a valuation not reasonably related to the actual value
of the mining property assessed at the beginning of that
tax year. (Smith Utah Mines & Smelters v. Beaver Cow1ty, 2G2 U.S. 325, 330-332, 43 S.Ct. 577, 518-580 (192:3).)
The Bec11:er County case involved an assessment of $:-Hn,G-±1.00 with respect to a wholly depleted mine, the valuation being based upon three times the net proceeds realized from operations conducted during the preceding yrar
in respect of the tailings dump remaining from the prior
operations. Speaking for a unanirnous Court, Mr. Justice
Sutherland stated:

"It follows that a given multiple of the net
annual proceeds which may be a fair measure
of value in the early part of a mine's development,
will become excessive as the stage of exhaustion
approaches. The constitutional provision, tlwrefore, at best, will produce only approximate equality. Undoubtedly in fixing the multiple of the net
annual proceeds upon which tlw value of metalliferous mines is to he calculated a good deal of
latitude must be allowed the Legislature and the
taxing authorities, hut tlw power is not un-
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ho nded. Without attempting to delimit the
um, 'ldarics-a matter primarily for the state
cou ·ts-it is sufficient for present pitrposcs to say
tlw · in our opinion they have ucen clearly exceer!ei/ in the instant case. To treble the total of
the .:i proceeds for the purpose of basing thereon
an 11ltogether fictitious 1x1l?te for a rni11e worked
out a11d worthless years before.the adoption of the
statutory provisions supposed to confer the auil10rity to do so, results in such flagrant and palpable injustice as would cast the most serious doubt
upon the constitutionality of such provisions if
thus construed. . . .

"It may ·well be that the taxable value of
mines differing in extent of development or in degree of exhaustion and relatively of different actual values, must from the practical necessities of
the case, be subjected to the same rule of measurement, although it may work inequality to some
extent. But the difference 7Jctween a mine froni
which ore is still being or still may be extracted
and net income derive.cl, and one conceded to be an
empty shell, with no present or prospective value
1chatsoever, is so obvi011s that the imposition of a
tax upon the basis of their being, nevertheless,
one and the same camwt ue sustained with due
regard for either law or logic." (Emphasis added.)
(2G2 U.S. 32G at 330-332, 43 S. C. 577 at 579-580.)
The case now before this Court is squarely within
hoth the rationale and the holding of the Beaver County
ease. Plaintiff submits that upon well accepted principles of federal constitutional law, the valuation of
worthless property for ad valorem tax purposes at a
rnluo in excess of $12,000,000.00, and the levy of a tax
hasecl on such assessments in an amount Pxceeding
$500,000.00, would, if sustained, constitute a taking of

vroperty without due process of law, and a denial to
plaintiff of tlu~ equal protection of the laws. (In re
Chicago Rys. Co., 79 F. Supp. 989 (N.D. Ill. 19-18),
affirmed 175 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1949), certiorari denied,
338 F.S. 850, 70 S. Ct. 9-1, 9-1 L. Ed. 520 (19-!9); Stone
1°. City of Springfield, lGS N.E. 2d 7G (.~fass. 19GO);
People ex rel. Ross i:. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co.,±-!
N.E. 2d 566 (Ill. 19-!2); Appeal of National Bulik of
Tulsa, 312 P.2d 495 (Okl. 1957).)

(B) ARTICLE XIII, SIDCTIONS 2 AKD 3;
ARTICLE YI, SJ;~CTION 2()(8); AND
ARTICLE I, SF~CTION 24, CONsrrrrruTION OF U'l'AH.
Article XIII, Seetion 2 of the Constitution of l 'tali
provid0s in relevant part as follows:
"All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the United States, or undPr
this constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to
its value, to be asc0rtained as provid0d b~- law.

"

ArticlP XIII, SPction 3 of the Constitution of Ftah
provides in relevant part as follows:
"The Legislature shall provide by la\Y a
·uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation
on all tangible property in the State, according
to its value in money, 8.nd shall prescribe by law
such regulations as shall secure a just valuation
for taxation of such propert~Y, so that every pPrson and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion
to th0 valrn• of his, h<•r, or its tangible prop0rty

"
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Article YI, :Section 26(8) of the Constitution of
[tali provides in relevant part as follows:
"The Legislature is prohibited from enacting
any private or special laws in the following cases:
(8) Assessing and collecting taxes."
Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of Utah
provides in relevant part as follows:
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."
These several constitutional prov1s10ns express a
clear and consistent policy requiring that the laws of this
State, including particularly those laws relating to taxation of property, be applied even-handedly.
The actions of defendants in this case patently violate this public policy. Defendants seek payment from
plaintiff of $500,000.00 in taxes for the year 1965 even
though the property taxed, the value of which ought to be
the measure of plaintiff's proportionate tax burden, was
wholly without value throughout said ta.ox year.
The cited provisions of the Constitution of Utah
<>xpress limitations equivalent to those imposed by the
federal Constitution, as stated by the United States
Supreme Court in the Bea1:er County case, supra. Plaintiff respectfully submits that these federal and state
limitations, both Federal and State, \Vould be clearly
neeeded by defendants' attempts in this case, as in the
Beaver County case, if defendants attempts were sucC'Pssful in assessing as metalliferous mines, upon the
basis of prior operational proceeds, properties that have
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no vahw, either as mdallif'erons 111inPs or othl•rwise properties that, in fact, 110 longer constitute mines at all.

POINT V.
THE PROVISIONS OF THE RJ~\TENUl~
AND TAXATION CODE, IF DEKl\lED TO
GIVE RISE TO PERSONAL LIABILITY
CONSTirrUTE AN ARBITRARY AND UN-'
R EA S 0 NAB LE CLASSIFiiCArrION OF
URANIUl\I AND VANADIUl\l l\lINES IN
YIOLATION 0 F '11 HE FOllRTEENTll
Al\IENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUION OF
THE UNITED srrA'1 1 ES AND ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 26(8) AND ARTICL1~ I, SECTION
2-1 OF THE CONSTI'l1 U'rION OF UTAH.
Defendants have stipulated that to their knowledge
neithe1· they nor their predecessors in office have at any
time in the history of this State attempted to effect collection of real property taxl~S by issuing and executing
upon warrants. Defendants have also stipulated that
neither they nor their predecessors in office have at
any time in the history of this State sought to impose
personal liability for rPal property taxes except with
respect to uranium and vanadium mining properties.
Section 59-5-65, Utah 'Code Annotated, 1953, which defendants have invoked heretofore in this controversy
in an effort to secure payment of the subject taxr>s from
plaintiff, applies, b:v ih; terms, only to uranium and vanadium mining· properties and operators.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that these facts, taken
together with the deliberate, anomalous and dedicated
campaign that defendants have undC'rtaken against plain-

tiff, demonstrate that the actions of defendants are arbitrary, discriminatory and unreasonable, and hence in
derogation of plaintiff's rights under the Constitution
of the United States and the Constitution of Utah. It is
:-:dtled that a state cannot satisfy the limitations of the
Fourteen Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States by the imposition of a tax that, as in this case,
is apvlied differently as to taxpayers of the same class.
(Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. G62, 69 S. Ct.
1:291, 9;3 L. Ed. 15-±4 (19-±9); Blaustein v. Levin,-± A.2d 861
(::\[cl. 1939); Y owigstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. City of
row1gstown, 108 N.E. 2d 571 (Ohio App. 1951); New
r ork State Trailer Coach Ass'n v. Steckel, U.-± N.Y.S. 2d
8:2 ( 1955).) The prohibited discrimination may arise not
only from the statutory provisions themselves, but also
from the mode in which the ta.x is administered. (Dehydrating Process Co. of Gloucester v. City of Gloucester,
135 N.E. 2d 20 (l\1ass. 1956); Federal Land Bank of
lluuston v. State, 31-± S.vV. 2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).)
The cited provisions of the Constitution of Utah
import the same standards of equality and due process
in the application of taxing statutes as do the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
and plaintiff submits that defendants' conduct violates
both the federal and state constitutional standards. The
eitt•d provisions of the federal and state constitutions
prohibit invidious and unreasonable discriminations in
tlw administration of taxation laws.

2G
The stipulated facts show that defendants seek to
apply different treatment to IJlaintiff in the issuance of
and execution upon the subject warrants than has ever
in the history of this State been applied to any owner
or operator of real property for collection of real property ta...xes. Plaintiff respectfully submits that the application of the taxing statutes of the State of Utah attempted by defendants in this case must fail because such
application clearly violates the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of lTtah.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Jen decision
correctly states the law applicable to this case. There is no
personal liability in the State of Utah for real property
taxes. The statutes of Utah do not give rise to personal
liability for the payment of real property taxes, whether
the attempt to impose personal liability is made under
the guise of a direct action, the use of warrants or any
other device which the imagination and methods of defendants may devise. Once the fundamental question has
been decided, as it was in the Jen case, it cannot and
should. not be circumvented by flimsy distinctions and
devious procedures. Further, plaintiff should not be subjected constantly to the inconvenience, expense and
embarrassment of all the prosecutorial procedures defendants can invent in their attempt to create personal
liability for real property taxes ~when the Supreme Court
of this State has determined that personal liability for
such taxes does not exist and the Legislature of this
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has refused to create personal liability for such
taxt>s. To vermit an administrative body to circumvent
the decisions of this Court or to exercise legislative
powers would weaken and discredit the stability, consistency and wisdom of our laws and the decisions of this
Court.
~Hate

Adherence to the Jen decision renders unnecessary
a consideration of the additional Points upon which plaintiff relies in the foregoing brief. Only if the clear holding
of the Jen decision should be overturned does it become
fi(~cessary to consider the additional Points going to the
qut>stions of constitutionality under both the federal and
the state constitutions. Should the deliberations of the
Court take it to the constitutional questions, it is
submitted that defendants' actions, both in the assessment of admittedly worthless mining property and in
th(• isolated use of warrants as against this property
owner, contrary to anything that has occurred in the
prior history of this State, must be struck down as
clParly in violation of both federal and state constitutional provisions.
There is more at stake in this case than the tax dollars that defendants seek to collect from this plaintiff.
Dl~fendants' methods to attain their end and vindicate
their disdain for the Jen decision threaten fundamental
concepts of law. The time-honored phrase "the power to
tax is the power to destroy" rings a clear note of warning
in this case. This case illustrates that there is a fine
line between responsible and circumspect enforcement of
law, and misrule. Plaintiff has been intimidated with

the threat of execution upon all of its real and tangibh·
personal pro1wrty in three eounties despite the most
recent decision of this Court that there is no personal
liability for the payment of real property taxes, and in
the face of a ck'ar absence of any statutory authority for
the use of warrants to collect real propert.v taxes. But
for the relid afforded through a review by this Court,
plaintiff's real and tangible personal property might nmr
be sold without the slightest eoncern on the part of defendants.
If defendants' conduct, and the procedures that they
have followed in this case, are ~mstainecl by this Court,
the time may well come when a \\-arrant will be docketed
against a home owner in January of a given tax year
without the real property tax on his home having become due or delinquent until the succeeding November;
an ex parte Sheriff's sale could be initiated and held
without notice to the home owner, subjecting all of his
real and tangible personal property in the State to sale;
nor would a right of redemption from the sale exist, as
has always been recognized in Utah concerning tax sales
of real property. Defendants' theories are indeed both
summary and violent.

l'laintiff re::;vectfully urges thi::; Court to issue its
PNP111ptury 'Writ of Prohibition herein and thereby pro,;nilH~ tlw actions of th<•::;e State officers who have acted
irrPsponsihly and without care and circumspection in the
adlllinistration of the laws of thi::; State and in the exercisl' of the powers entrusted to them.
Respectfully submitted,

VAN COT'l', BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & ;\foCARTHY
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON
LEONARD J. LE,VIS
DAVID E. SALISBURY
Attorneys for Plaintiff

